“The Power of the Ought”: An Interview with Ambassador Max Kampelman

n 1980, Max Kampelman was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a post he would hold until 1983. Subsequently, he headed the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Nuclear and Space Arms Control in Geneva (1985-1989), and served as Counselor to the Department of State (1987-1989). He is currently of counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson in Washington, DC.

On January 26th, Amb. Kampelman sat down with Journal editor Ilan Berman to discuss nuclear disarmament and the future of U.S. democracy promotion.

You are one of the principal architects of the nuclear disarmament concept that is known today as Global Zero. What are the origins of this effort?

My interest in this dates back to 1985, when President Ronald Reagan and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev decided to revive negotiations over nuclear weapons between our two countries. Following his initial meeting with Gorbachev, Reagan called a White House meeting of his staff, during which he mentioned that he had suggested to Gorbachev the desirability of “going to zero” on all of our nuclear weapons.

I was at that session, and I remember virtually unanimous consternation among Reagan’s advisors at the proposal. Practically everyone there believed it was not in our interest to destroy our nuclear weapons. Reagan listened attentively to them, but he moved ahead with a major effort to draw down the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

President Reagan asked me to head the delegation to those negotiations. In three years, we succeeded in producing two treaties—one which totally abolished our intermediate-range nuclear weapons and another that reduced the number of our longer-range strategic nuclear weapons by half. They started us down a path toward a nuclear-free world.

A great number of senior statesmen agree with you. Former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Senator Sam Nunn, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and many other notables have embraced the idea of “going to zero” that you have championed. But how realistic do you think such an effort is?

I think many people believe this ought to be done, but few think it can be. As for me, I believe in the power of the “ought.” Sixty years ago, when the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published his study of the Negro in America, the idea of equality was far from universal. Today, we have a black president. That political movement, of the “is” to the “ought,” of what is to what could and should be, is what has made America and its form of democracy so revered. Today, our role in the world must be to help establish a civilized “ought” for the human race—the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.

I am under no illusion that this will be easy. But the alternative is unimaginable.

One of the chief complaints aired by critics of the Global Zero movement is the difficulty of truly verifiable nuclear disarmament. After all, a durable framework for verification is difficult enough when one discusses state actors. But what about non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, which are hell-bent on acquiring the same sort of capabilities without any of the institutional constraints that states have?

In my judgment, neutralizing them is largely a by-product of state compliance. We ought to have a worldwide pledge that governments cannot allow this sort of “leakage” to happen, which would be backed up by total political, economic and cultural isolation for violators. By prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons among states, we must also establish a procedure against cheating by making it impossible for sub-state groups to acquire them as well.

Given your earliest government service, as America’s point man at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, you understand the importance of democracy promotion. The Bush administration’s years in office saw a number of democratic transformations in places like Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon. Currently, however, it is not at all clear that those gains will be sustained over time. How do you see the Bush administration’s legacy on this front?

Within every single country in the world, there are now groups fighting for the advancement of democracy. There are also inevitably dictatorial types who resist these efforts. It is a continual struggle, certainly, but it is also one that is moving slowly but surely in favor of democratic processes. There is no longer a question about whether democracy ought to be. This does not mean that the drive for unilateral power by some will not continue. But we are an infinitely more civilized world today than we were a thousand years ago, and this movement is inexorable. President Reagan helped to establish that commitment and goal.

The country where all the trends we discussed come together, most immediately, is Iran. The Obama administration has already made clear that they plan to depart from the policies of their predecessor and engage with the Islamic Republic. When they do, what should they be asking for, and what should they be requesting in return?

First and foremost, our goal should be to get Iran to give up its nuclear program. We also should be strengthening democracy trends where they exist, including in Iran.

Those two themes are not incompatible. In my opinion, we will have no influence on the current Iranian regime, as it presently stands. The regime there is an irresponsible international actor, and there is every indication it is proceeding with its nuclear program. Strengthening democratic trends is therefore the best way to foster change—and thereby to neutralize the threat posed by the current regime, including the nuclear one.