The Missile Defense Mission

Jeff Kueter

oday, the United States has unquestioned dominance on the modern battlefield. The integration of real-time communications, navigation, and overhead surveillance in support of tactical operations, the expanded use of precision-guided, stand-off munitions, the superiority of airpower, and many other capabilities all provide the U.S. with warfighting advantages not possessed by any other nation—namely, the ability to direct overwhelming force to precise points quickly and with high probability of survival of the attacking force. These same capabilities, however, have caused adversaries of the United States to shift their strategies and their choice of weapons. A key trend in this regard is the pursuit of weapons that place U.S. assets at risk and increase the costs of confrontation to unacceptable levels—ballistic missiles chief among them.

The technology is certainly not new. The first ballistic missiles were used by the Germans during World War II. Carrying conventional munitions, the German missiles attempted to compensate for the loss of their airpower and incite terror in the minds of the British population. The marriage of missiles with nuclear warheads by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, however, greatly expanded their lethality and strategic importance. Now capable of delivering nuclear munitions to points throughout the globe with virtually no warning, no chance of return, and no defense, the nuclear-armed ballistic missile fundamentally restructured the geopolitical security environment. Concepts of deterrence emerged as leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to preserve their own security amidst the prospect of global annihilation. As the Cold War ended, new security challenges replaced strategic nuclear competition, and the proliferation of missile technology complicated those challenges.

As more nations acquire ballistic missile capabilities, the role of defenses against missile attacks is also changing. Throughout the Cold War, discussions over the feasibility of defenses invariably became debates over the effectiveness of deterrence.1 Critics claimed defenses would destabilize the prevailing condition of mutual insecurity. If one superpower came to believe that the other could protect itself from attack, then the other was vulnerable and more prone to take offensive risks. In the post-Cold War era, these concepts may no longer apply. Whether U.S. nuclear forces can deter nations such as Iran or North Korea remains a hotly contested question in contemporary security debates. And as more nations acquire ballistic missile capability, the potential for their accidental or intentional use grows.

Ballistic missiles in modern warfare

Writing in 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, better known as the Rumsfeld Commission, offered a compelling summary of the utility of ballistic missiles in modern warfare. It noted that:

Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the roles of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have both evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons. For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these nations can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward-based forces and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.

Whether short or long range, a successfully launched ballistic missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the United States.2

Strategic competitors of the United States are still investing heavily in these technologies. Russia maintains an impressive and technically sophisticated arsenal of missiles and nuclear capabilities and, recognizing the significance of the nuclear arsenal to its geopolitical influence, Russian President Medvedev recently announced an aggressive plan to completely overhaul Russian nuclear forces by 2020.3 China’s nuclear arsenal is smaller than that of Russia, but growing in both size and capability. To that end, estimates suggest China’s forces may soon grow into “a smaller version of the former Soviet threat.”4

In large measure, these capabilities are oriented against the United States. The superiority of U.S. conventional forces on the battlefield has accelerated the embrace of missile technologies by peer competitors. The relative immaturity of current defensive capabilities, coupled with the superior firepower of the missile platform, makes them an appealing weapon system. Thus, China is investing in new missile technologies to check U.S. involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan. In particular, Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles have raised alarms among U.S. policymakers because of their apparent purpose to destroy American aircraft carriers. According to the Pentagon’s 2008 report on Chinese military power:

China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of China’s anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances.5

Reports suggest these capabilities will become operational in 2009.6 Carrier-killing missiles would greatly complicate U.S. actions to defend Taiwan or other areas, where the projection of carrier-borne airpower is often among the first military responses to a region of crisis.

Other adversaries are pursuing missiles for similar ends. Following a recent test launch of a long-range missile, Gen. Hossein Salami, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard ground forces, was reported as saying, “We want to tell the world that those who conduct their foreign policy by using the language of threat against Iran have to know that our finger is always on the trigger and we have hundreds even thousands of missiles ready to be fired against predetermined targets.”7 Similar statements emanate from North Korea. Both, like Iraq before them, are using their missile arsenals to deter and retaliate against regional foes and U.S. forces in the region. Commenting on the same test, the Islamic Republic News Agency said the Iranian missiles “were tested to demonstrate Iran’s capability in hitting its enemies accurately at the early stages of their probable attacks ….”8

In the years ahead, ballistic missiles will remain instruments of coercive power. They deter potential adversaries and enable retaliation or preemptive strikes without the need to develop an air force or gaining air superiority. They allow the attacker to strike targets of varying ranges with a high degree of accuracy and enormous lethality, whether nuclear or conventionally armed. Not surprisingly, then, more and more nations seek to acquire them.

A growing worldwide threat

The drawdown in missile arsenals by the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia may have reduced the total of ballistic missiles worldwide since the end of the Cold War, but the number of countries fielding some type of ballistic missile capability has increased substantially. Today, some 28 countries are estimated to be capable of fielding ballistic missiles of various varieties.9 Part of this increase is attributable to the Soviet Union’s fragmentation into many independent states, some of which (e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan) maintained the arsenals stationed on their territories during Soviet times. Yet, many countries, particularly in the Middle East, are also acquiring longer-range and more powerful missiles through indigenous development or purchase from China, Russia, and North Korea.

China is one of five nations with intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities (ranges over 5,500 kilometers), but short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) constitute the majority of Beijing’s force. The operational SRBM arsenal includes the CSS-6, 7, and 8 missiles. The CSS-6 and CSS-7 are solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles, carrying payloads of up to 500 kilograms while traveling 600 and 300 km, respectively.10 China’s medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) forces are primarily focused on deterring Russian interference in the Pacific Rim and exerting regional influence. These missiles are capable of striking Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.11

China’s ICBMs can strike the United States, but it is developing new capabilities as well. Approximately twenty CSS-4 liquid-fueled missiles are estimated to reside in silos throughout China. This missile has a 13,000-km range and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.12 Additionally, Beijing is working on three ICBM development projects: the CSS-9, Julang-2 SLBM, and CSS-X-10. The CSS-9 will add a road-mobile component to the current silo-based force, which will eventually match the CSS-4’s range. Current estimates suggest the Julang-2 will be deployed on Type 094 submarines before 2011; its range of 8,000 kilometers will allow Beijing to target the United States from sea-based platforms near the Chinese mainland for the first time.13 The solid-fueled CSS-X-10’s fully operational deployment is also expected this decade, at which time it will become the centerpiece of Beijing’s nuclear strike force.14

The Russian Federation inherited the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile program, including a wide array of SRBM and ICBM capabilities. Russia recently completed testing on the Iskander SRBM with a 300-kilometer range and payload capacity of 480 kilograms. When the Iskander becomes operational, Russia plans to export it to Belarus, Iran, and Syria as well as use it to upgrade its own SRBM forces.15

Russia’s advanced ICBM program has solid- and liquid-fueled missiles including some with submarine launch capabilities. The SS-27 Topol-M is Russia’s principal long-range missile development program, and is quickly replacing the SS-18 Satan as Russia’s top ICBM. Though it lacks the Satan’s payload capacity (1,200 kilograms), the Topol-M can be outfitted with MIRV technology.16 Deployment of the Topol-M began in 2008.17

SLBM capabilities are provided by the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 Sineva. The Russian military is developing a SLBM-version of the Topol-M called the SS-N-27 Bulava. Once fully operational, the Bulava will extend Russia’s SLBM range to 10,000 km while carrying ten or more MIRV warheads.18

North Korea not only poses a threat to U.S. interests and allies in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, but to the continental U.S. itself. Its role as a key cog in the international marketplace for missile technology lends it additional importance. On July 4, 2006, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong 2, with the capability of hitting the west coast of the U.S. (3,500-5,500-kilometer range).19 Despite the missile’s failure 40 seconds after launch, U.S. officials say, “North Korea’s engineers probably learned enough to make modifications, not only to its long-range ballistic missiles, but also to its shorter-range systems.”20 As of this writing, North Korea reportedly is preparing for another round of missile tests.

North Korea possesses an increasingly capable arsenal of SRBMs and MRBMs in addition to its Taepo Dong 2 program. Its short-range ballistic missiles are variants on the basic SCUD design. It purchased approximately 100 Hwasong 5 (300-kilometer range) road-mobile SCUD-B missiles and indigenously produced around 100 Hwasong 6 and 7 (500- and 700-kilometer ranges, respectively) missiles.21 The Hwasong 6 and 7s give Pyongyang the ability to “bombard all targets in South Korea critical to a Communist invasion.”22

North Korea’s operational medium-range No Dong (1,300-kilometer range) missiles are single-stage, liquid-fueled missiles derived from SCUD technology. No Dong research and development in the 1980s produced the Taepo Dong programs. The Taepo Dong 1 is a medium-range missile (1,500-2,000-kilometer range) carrying a 1,000-1,500-kilogram warhead to target. Pyongyang tested the Taepo Dong 1 over the Sea of Japan on August 31, 1998, generating a political firestorm in Japan and the U.S.23 In total, North Korea is estimated to have deployed at least 750 ballistic missiles, including between 600-800 SCUDs, 150-2,000 No Dongs, and 10-20 Taepo Dong 1s.24

Iran has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, comprising several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs.25 Its short-range capabilities were developed indigenously and with assistance from China, Russia, and, especially, North Korea.26 The short-range arsenal includes the Shahab-1 (SCUD-B variant), Shahab-2 (SCUD-C variant), M-9 and M-11, and the Fatah A-1000 (Zelzal variant). The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 are the most advanced of the group, with range capabilities of 300 and 700 kilometers and maximum payloads of 1,000 and 700 kilograms, respectively.27

Iran has made considerable progress with its Shahab-3 MRBM program, a derivative of the North Korean No Dong-1. It was first deployed in June 2003, but by May 2005, Iran had successfully tested a solid-fuel Shahab-3 and expanded its range to 2,000 kilometers, providing Iran with the capability to strike Israel, Turkey, and American forces stationed in the Middle East.28

More importantly, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that Iran might acquire ICBM capabilities by 2015, conditional on access to foreign technology from North Korea and/or Russia.29 The ICBM work is closely related to Iran’s space program, which successfully placed a satellite into orbit in February 2009.30

Pakistan and Syria are the other most commonly cited missile proliferators that might pose a threat to the United States. With a focus on their regions, their missile arsenals are filled with SRBM and MRBM missiles largely derived from the SCUD. Outside of the NATO countries, India and Israel also have active missile development programs.

Toward twenty-first century defense

In December 2002, President Bush set the United States on course to defend against these threats. In doing so, his administration laid out plans for a “modest” defense against the rogue state ballistic missile threat (North Korea and Iran), available for limited defensive missions, beginning in 2004.31 These efforts were clearly considered just a starting point for the development and eventual deployment of improved and expanded capabilities in the years ahead. The Bush administration’s program, while free from the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) from which he withdrew the U.S. in 2002, pushed forward the missile defenses which were most mature at the time the political decision to move ahead was made.

The resulting layered defense was made up of individual interception systems linked by a communications and sensor network. There is no single missile defense system, but instead a “system of systems” designed to be interoperable and geared toward one or more of the three phases of ballistic missile flight.

Currently, the U.S. is nearing the goal of 30 ground-based midcourse interceptors (GMD) in missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Eighteen Aegis ships are equipped with the long-range surveillance and tracking capabilities needed to perform ballistic missile defense missions and are armed with 60 Standard Missile Three (SM-3) midcourse and SM-2 terminal phase interceptors. The Patriot PAC-3 terminal defensive system is complete. The Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom, the Cobra Dane radar, the Sea-Based X-Band radar, and the forward-based transportable X-Band radar are in service, and communications and battle management systems and software linking the whole system are under development. Together, these technologies offer a rudimentary but incomplete defense capable of attempting interceptions in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight.

As these systems move from their research and development phases to operational deployment, the warfighter is more engaged in planning for use of missile defenses in combat. Tests of the Aegis and GMD systems are run by active-duty sailors and soldiers, as was the February 2008 destruction of a de-orbiting intelligence satellite with Aegis BMD assets. Operational use of the Patriot and PAC-3 systems during the Iraqi conflicts offered insights into how missile defenses operate during wartime environments. Together these experiences, combined with analytical work on concepts of operation, offer illustrations for how missile defenses will be used.

Yet these capabilities are still relatively modest. The defense deployed by President Bush during his tenure is designed overwhelmingly to address the threats posed by North Korea and Iran; nations with relatively small missile arsenals of presently limited, but growing, sophistication. Current budgeting will certainly help to improve the quantitative capabilities of the current missile defense architecture; the U.S. will purchase more GMD, THAAD, or SM-3 interceptors, outfit more Aegis vessels with BMD capabilities, and expand the number of sensors or radars. But for those seeking a truly global defense against missile threats of growing number and sophistication, it is clear that a new approach is needed.

The reasons are clear. The ballistic missile will remain an instrument of power for the foreseeable future. Designing effective defenses to protect the American people, our friends and allies abroad and our deployed military forces is important, not only for the lives such defenses can save, but also because their mere existence discourages others from using their offensive weaponry. If defenses are not seen as credible, if they fail to keep pace with the size and capability of the threat, they will provide little more than a false sense of protection. Missile arsenals are increasing in size and sophistication. New challengers will emerge, and old challengers may return. U.S. policy, programs, and budgets must recognize these facts, and embrace the need for quantitative and qualitative improvements to missile defense.

Jeff Kueter is president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a public policy institute focused on scientific issues with an impact on public policy. An expert on space security and missile defense, he has testified on both before the U.S. Congress, and serves as a contributor on strategic issues for the print and television media.