A Middle Way on Space
While the epic struggle between the United States and Soviet Union turned space into a political and military arena for confrontation for more than three decades, the years following the end of the Cold War saw America’s unchallenged primacy blanket the cosmos. Since China’s testing of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007 and the subsequent U.S. intercept of a failed satellite in February 2008, however new attention is being paid to an issue that once seemed all but settled.
The implications of China’s successful ASAT test left U.S. politicians and military planners asking questions about China’s intentions and the maturity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) space program. Is the United States prepared to contend with another state power able to target its space assets? What will such a capability mean for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the Taiwan Strait? Is the weaponization of space inevitable?
Predictably, the D.C. think tank circuit responded, churning out a slew of journal articles and publications on space security. Bruce W. MacDonald’s China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security represents the latest contribution to this evolving debate.
Unlike traditional geographic domains, space is a medium that is severely lacking in strategic theory (there is, at least as of yet, no Clausewitz or Mahan for space). MacDonald’s work makes no attempt to tackle such a grand task, but is nevertheless a worthwhile contribution and valuable overview of the topic. It includes a reprint of the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy (NSP), takes time to explain what is frequently assumed to be a trivial difference between space “weaponization” and space “militarization,” and explains in brief the different types of offensive and defensive space systems.
MacDonald gets the big picture right, identifying America’s constellations of satellites as the hub of its military power. First demonstrated during the Gulf War in 1991, the ability of the joint military to communicate information, gather and disseminate intelligence, navigate, and even guide missiles to their targets is all highly dependent upon space. Inevitably, as MacDonald explains, this dependence has become a vulnerability in the eyes of near-term peer competitors like China, which seek innovative asymmetric means to neutralize the ability of the United States to project power, specifically in a crisis scenario involving Taiwan. Regardless of what China may say in public regarding space issues, MacDonald asserts, “The PLA envisions conflict in space and is preparing for it… leaving the United States with no choice but to hedge prudently against this uncertainty.”
But while his recognition of the vulnerability, the threat, and the need to take serious action to protect space assets is sound and consistent with the findings of the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy, MacDonald finds himself at odds with two of its major principles. First, the 2006 Space Policy declares, “The United States considers space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its national interests,” and will “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” MacDonald, however, seems to think we should do otherwise. While he recognizes U.S. space assets are indeed “vital,” he notes that because “U.S. attacks on the space capabilities of others run a high risk of sparking counterattacks and the costs of hardening U.S. systems against similar attacks are so high,” retaining the right to use offensive action will only place America’s vital space assets at more risk.
Second, MacDonald believes the rejection of new legal regimes for space by the 2006 NSP is counterproductive. While he accepts that legal mechanisms cannot solve space security problems and that a broad-based ban on ASAT weapons is unattainable, he is supportive of a ban on testing or demonstrating “hit-to-kill” direct ascent ASAT weapons that produce destructive space debris and have irreversible effects that he fears may lead to escalation. We are thus left with what MacDonald calls a policy of deterrence-based superiority, combining temporary and less provocative offensive measures (electronic jamming or laser blinding, for instance), with a ban on “hit-to-kill” ASATs, defensive systems, continued dialogue, and confidence-building measures. The result is a strategy that is concerned more with the debris created by “hit-to-kill” ASATs and their escalatory nature than with constructing a robust regime to prevent such attacks and ensure America’s unhindered access to space.
Additionally, MacDonald assumes that space dominance, similar to the way the United States dominates the air or seas, is generally unattainable due to the low barriers to entering the offensive space realm and the high costs of attempting to defend space assets. While he is correct to an extent, dominance is not as unattainable as MacDonald professes. An affordable and attainable means to ensure access, while not accepting China’s long-term pursuit of space parity, lies with deploying and maintaining numerous reserve microsatellites that are cheap, responsive, and nimble.
MacDonald’s work is likely only one of a slew of publications on the topic that we can expect to see in the immediate future, as the debate over space security, and America’s place in it, takes center stage. President Obama has already outlined his stark differences with the Bush administration on the subject. MacDonald’s approach—which dismisses space dominance and “hit-to-kill” ASATs, but also emphasizes the need for a balance of offensive and defensive tools in space—charts what may best be described as a middle way in the debate, one that could serve as a starting point for the new administration.
Eric Sayers is a National Security Research Assistant at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC.
