Gambling with Theory
Delineating the connections between theory and practice in matters of nuclear deterrence and warfighting is a daunting task. But, armed with solid academic credentials and years of practical experience, Keith Payne has undertaken just such an effort. And his meticulous research and penetrating analysis have produced what is almost certain to become the definitive analytical work on the subject for the period covering the 1960s through the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.
The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century reveals what an extraordinary gamble America’s intellectual and political leaders took in formulating and applying the theory behind the “balance of terror” that governed the possession and use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. That theory bet the survival of the country on the premise that exposing its population and economic structure to the most devastating weapon man ever invented is the surest path to security. Most disturbingly, Payne explains, both academic and political leaders today continue to be drawn to this theory as the basis for policy, despite the fact that the world is a fundamentally different place from what it was during the Cold War.
Payne’s analysis reveals how the balance-of-terror theory behind nuclear deterrence was developed and sustained in a one-sided fashion. In virtually all other theories of warfare, the application of purely theoretical principles is balanced against insights derived from actual events, which in turn are used to refine and shape the theory. Our nuclear deterrence theory, however, has been all but completely deductive.
In a sense, this is unequivocally good news. The lack of direct nuclear-armed conflicts since the last days of World War II has prevented the broader use of inductive logic regarding nuclear warfare. The danger, however, is the temptation to see the absence of such a conflict as irrefutable proof that the theory works under virtually any circumstance. Payne’s greatest service is explaining why such an assumption is both dangerous and wrong. Drawing definitive conclusions about the validity of a theory from non-events and a lack of experience is, to put it mildly, a risky proposition.
Payne is careful, however, to point out that he is not asserting that broader deterrence theory makes no contribution to the formulation of wise and effective policies governing nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, including lessening the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. Rather, he states prudently, applications of the theory must vary in accordance with differing circumstances and conditions.
The Great American Gamble reserves its most forceful criticisms for those who have concluded that there is a condition of “existential deterrence” as long as the prospect of nuclear retaliation for any attack exists. It also rejects the derivative proposition, that an effective nuclear deterrence posture is severable from “warfighting” considerations and combat missions. Such a proposition, it points out, is both wrong and dangerous; it obviates the need to build a strategic posture that will meet the standards of military effectiveness that rest at the core of well-designed defense and national security strategies.
As Hamas rockets rain down on Israel, Payne’s observations serve to remind democratic leaders everywhere that their people, more than anything, want a military both willing and able to fully defend them. Gambling with their lives through unthinking adherence to a theory of deterrence that is almost certainly no longer applicable is simply irresponsible.
Much to his credit, Payne also recognizes the moral costs to the United States of applying the balance-of-terror theory of nuclear deterrence. It has long been a central tenet of Western philosophy that a just war will not involve purposeful attacks on innocent civilians. The balance-of-terror theory turned this principle on its head. At its height in the early 1960s, the theory assumed explicitly that U.S. retaliatory nuclear forces should be used to destroy 30 percent of the Soviet population. As is often the case, moral and practical judgments go hand in hand. In today’s world, continuation of a balance-of-terror policy raises the question of how it will benefit the United States to respond to an attack on its territory or the territory of a friend or ally with a weapon of mass destruction by incinerating the poor half-starved subjects of some distant tyranny.
If it could benefit from anything, Payne’s work might have spent more time at the outset explaining how the circumstances that encouraged the embrace of the balance-of-terror theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s were the result of the discredited effort to achieve nuclear disarmament in the 1940s. Represented most prominently by the Baruch Plan, the disarmament movement unrealistically assumed worldwide support for disarmament when the Soviet Union opposed it. The lesson—and one that policymakers in Washington should heed today—is that naïve attempts at nuclear disarmament can result in the pursuit of questionable alternatives when the attempts fail. To his credit, Payne does address the question of nuclear disarmament under today’s circumstances later in his book, and he makes a convincing case that there are serious problems with the vision being articulated by its proponents. A short treatment of the history behind the earlier effort, however, would have bolstered his call for caution.
Effective national security policies are the result of a careful balancing of theory and practice. Whether theory dominates practice or vice versa, the resulting imbalance will incur excessive policy risk. Payne’s book serves to remind policymakers that the balance-of-terror nuclear deterrence policies embraced by the U.S. in the 1960s were unbalanced in favor of theory over practice. His message is a well-timed warning that the fortuitous results of the Cold War also involved an extraordinary risk. In his words, it constituted a gamble. His careful analysis has provided sufficient warning that the odds against this gamble are only growing longer.
Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
