The Past and Future of Missile Defense: An Interview with Lieutenant General Henry Obering

Lieutenant General Henry “Trey” Obering, U.S.AF (ret.) served as Director of the Missile Defense Agency, the Pentagon’s dedicated ballistic missile defense organization, from July 2004 to January 2009. He is currently a Senior Vice President at Booz Allen Hamilton. He was interviewed in January 2010 by Journal editor Ilan Berman on the state of the missile defense debate in the United States, and the mounting threat to American security posed by foreign ballistic missile arsenals.

In December 2002, the Bush Administration made the momentous decision to abandon the 1972 ABM Treaty in favor of a policy of protecting the United States from ballistic missile attack. It did so by seeking to create a “system of systems” designed to defend the United States, its allies and its deployed forces. What was the rationale behind that approach?

Defeating ballistic missiles is a tough challenge that requires the “system of systems” approach that you refer to, implemented in an integrated, layered fashion. In this manner, you can take advantage of all phases of the missiles’ flight (boost/ascent, midcourse, and terminal). In addition, we were building defenses against all ranges of missiles (short, medium, intermediate and long). We were developing the Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) for the boost/ascent phase, the Ground-based Midcourse system (GMD) and Aegis Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) for the midcourse phase, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot 3 systems for the terminal phase. These interceptors were supported by orbiting infrared satellites, powerful new land- and sea-based radars, along with upgraded legacy radars. While the ABM treaty served its purpose with respect to the United States and Soviet Union, it was critical for us to leave the ABM treaty because it would have prevented us from deploying such a system of systems to address the serious emerging ballistic missile threats from North Korea, Iran and other countries.

Since taking office, the Obama Administration has charted a very different course. Current plans call for a reduction of some $1.4 billion in the Missile Defense Agency’s year 2010 budget. What systems will fall by the wayside as a result?

The good news here is that the administration did not do what many observers expected, and eliminate the missile defense program outright, or reduce its budget by more than $5 billion. This did not happen because of the demands of warfighters and an increasing awareness on the part of the administration of the value in continuing the development and deployment of missile defenses.

The $1.4 billion reduction was a major factor in the termination or cutback of the ABL, KEI and GMD programs, however. In addition, the termination of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program was a major setback; it would have provided KEI, GMD and Aegis interceptors with the ability to destroy more than one object per interceptor, thereby addressing the emerging countermeasures we expect an attacker to employ in the ascent or midcourse phases. And if the budget continues to be reduced, the Missile Defense Agency will have trouble adequately funding needed development programs to address maturing threats, carrying out robust testing to ensure that the systems we develop are effective, procuring sufficient numbers of interceptors and sensors, and maintaining the systems we have already fielded.

The most direct consequence of the Obama Administration’s new approach to missile defense has been the cancellation of Bush-era plans for a “third site” of interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic. What was the rationale behind the “third site,” and what effect will its termination have?

Under the original plan, we were addressing the short- to medium-range threats from Iran by modifying more Aegis ships for BMD capability, more than doubling the number of SM-3s and THAADs (to a combined total of more than 440 by 2015-2016), and initiating the land-based SM-3. To address the emerging long-range threat, we had planned for a forward-deployed radar in the Caucasus or Southeastern Europe, a proven radar in the Czech Republic (operational in 2013), two-stage ground-based interceptors in Poland (beginning in 2013 and completing in 2015), assuming ratification of all the necessary basing agreements in late 2008 or early 2009. This architecture would have provided short- to medium-range protection in the near term, and long-range protection of both the United States and Europe starting in the 2013-15 time frame. The deployed architecture would also have had an ability to deal with an initial complement of countermeasures/decoys.

The new plan in essence eliminates the GBIs in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic while maintaining the forward-deployed radar and adding UAV-based infrared sensors into the architecture. It also calls for the deployment of a land-based SM-3 in the 2015 time frame, with eventual deployment of more sophisticated SM-3s toward the end of the decade.

The real difference between the two plans is that the United States has delayed any defense against intermediate to long-range threats until the end of the decade. One other distinction is that we were pretty far down the road in our European site efforts. We had done extensive site surveys, soil analysis, initial designs and layouts along with detailed program management planning. The new plan, on the other hand, is just beginning to unfold; I am not aware of any announcements of specific site locations or plans.

The alternative missile defense plan put forward by the Obama Administration entails a significant reorientation toward sea-based midcourse defenses. What are the reasons underpinning this shift? What are its benefits and drawbacks?

There are probably several reasons for the shift. First, the administration’s revised threat assessment is that the Iranians would not have an intermediate- or long-range missile until much later than the original projection of 2015. Second, the Russians strongly opposed the stationing of long-range interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic, for largely geopolitical reasons. Third, there was a sense that sea-based missile defenses were more mature and more proven.

The benefits of the new approach are that we are moving ahead with developing and deploying missile defenses against the short- to medium-range threats in the European theater. Continuing to engage with NATO and our allies on this deployment is beneficial. In addition, there is inherent flexibility in the planned sea-based defenses, which provide valuable capability to the warfighter.

But there also risks inherent in this new approach. It is clearly based on the long-range missile threat projections from the intelligence community regarding Iran. Intelligence threat assessments should be factors in laying out strategy, but not foundational because these projections can be inaccurate. I am reminded of the threat assessments regarding North Korea released in 1998. Those stated that they would not be able to launch a multi-stage long-range missile for years. They did so just a few weeks later.

There are also technical risks inherent in this approach. The two-stage long-range interceptor that had been planned for Poland is nearly identical to the three-stage version that has been so successful in its tests to date. The version of the SM-3 missile now planned for deployment in Europe, however, has not flown yet and is dramatically different from the SM-3 variant already tested. As for the more sophisticated versions of the SM-3 now planned, those have yet to be fully designed—much less built or flown.

Looking forward, what do you see as the greatest ballistic missile dangers facing the United States in the years ahead?

Iran can be expected to continue its robust missile development program. In the last two years alone, Iran has successfully launched the SAFIR space vehicle, demonstrating a multi-stage orbital capability, and twice successfully flown an indigenously produced solid-propellant missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers. Look for them to fly an intermediate-range missile capable of 3,500 kilometers or more within the next two to three years. Iran has also shown a propensity to proliferate, supplying short-range missiles to terrorist groups to be used against Israel. Combine these efforts with their nuclear program, and it makes them a very dangerous threat in the future.

North Korea is also pursuing a robust missile development program of short-range solid propellant missiles and medium- to long-range liquid fueled missiles. Their launch of an ICBM-quality multi-stage missile, the Taepo Dong 2, last year came very close to being successful. It demonstrated that North Korea had solved some of the more daunting challenges in building long-range missiles. The regime there has apparently already demonstrated a nuclear capability, which may be weaponized in the future, and poses an even greater proliferation threat than Iran.

Russia certainly has the numbers and quality of missiles to threaten the United States and our interests. But by far the country with the most active and accelerated ballistic missile development program is China. It has multiple programs for all ranges of missiles, and is tailoring its missile capabilities to counter U.S. power projection with our carrier battle groups and strategic reconnaissance with our satellites. It is also important to note that Russia has deployed a missile defense system, and China is in the process of doing so.

Finally, one cannot rule out the potential for an attack from an off-shore ship using a short- or medium-range missile. The ship could then be scuttled, which could eliminate any attribution. Several countries have actually demonstrated this capability as part of their test programs.