Nonproliferation, Russian Style

Stephen Blank

key component of the Obama administration’s new “reset” policy is the idea that a new relationship with the Kremlin can elicit Russian support for U.S. nonproliferation efforts relating to Iran and North Korea. The logic is clear; nonproliferation has long figured as the Administration’s highest priority, and Russia–a key strategic partner of the Islamic Republic and important regional interlocutor for the regime of Kim Jong Il–has the potential to play a key role.

To this end, the White House has recently granted Russia many incentives for its cooperation. It has agreed to accelerate negotiations on Moscow’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has resubmitted the U.S.-Russian treaty on civilian nuclear cooperation to Congress. Together with the Kremlin, it has issued a joint call for a nuclear-free Middle East. And it has acquiesced to a larger role for Russia in the diplomatic Quartet intended to facilitate the Arab-Israeli peace process.1

But is this approach justified? Does Russia really support U.S. nonproliferation goals, or even nonproliferation in general? A careful analysis indicates a very different and often antithetical Russian approach to these issues, and suggests that the belief in a shared threat assessment now being touted in Washington is sorely misplaced.

Misreading Russian attitudes

This misconceived approach is entirely our own fault. Moscow has made it abundantly clear that on proliferation issues it follows its own interests–interests that are qualitatively different from, and often opposed to, those of the United States. To be sure, Moscow opposes adding new members to the nuclear club and regards proliferation writ large as a threat.2 But beyond that, it diverges from U.S. thinking. Indeed, proliferation ranks a distant fifth in terms of threats in Russia’s new defense doctrine, behind a whole series of U.S.-inspired threats, among them NATO enlargement and the U.S. deployment of missile defenses.3

Also, unlike America, Russia evaluates proliferation issues not according to whether the regime in question is democratic, but on the basis of whether a country’s nuclearization would seriously threaten itself and its interests.4 Thus, when then-President Vladimir Putin–in an effort to assuage American fears over Iran–proposed in June 2007 to allow the United States to jointly manage the Russian missile defense radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, then-Russian General Staff Chief Yuri Baluyevsky downplayed the danger from Iran, insisting “this trend is not something catastrophic, which would require a global missile defense system deployed near Russian borders.”5 Accordingly, Moscow has tended to view American policy towards nonproliferation in jaundiced fashion, displaying a visible schadenfreude when North Korea tested missiles and then a nuclear weapon in July and October 2006. Or alternatively, Russian officialdom views Washington’s insistence on nonproliferation controls largely as an effort to pressure competitors in the nuclear and arms markets.6

Due to its vulnerability, Russia’s non-proliferation stance is much more cautious and flexible than that of the U.S. Indeed, Moscow sees both the DPRK and Iran as potential partners, not enemies, and therefore will not categorically oppose their programs as does Washington. To the contrary; similar to the way it was viewed by the Soviet leadership in the 1980s, instability in the Middle East is seen by the Kremlin as a headache for the United States that raises Moscow’s worth as an arbiter and problem-solver.7

Moreover, given Russia’s post-Cold War weakness it has been forced to confront other security threats that are incomparably more urgent to it than proliferation. These threats, as articulated by Alexei Arbatov of the Moscow Carnegie Center, include:

Instability and conflict across the “post-Soviet space” and in the North Caucasus;

NATO’s continued expansion to the east, against strong Russian objections.

The continuing stagnation of the Russian armed forces and defense industries, and Russia’s growing conventional and nuclear inferiority to the United States and NATO;

The threat of expanding Muslim radicalism in Central Asia;

The ominous growth of China’s economic and military power; and

U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe.8

This is not to say that Russia is not worried about proliferation. Kremlin officials have made clear that the issue ranks high on their list of national security priorities. As Vladimir Putin told the BBC in June 2003, “If we are speaking about the main threat of the twenty-first century, then I consider this to be the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”9 This concern isn’t simply rhetorical. Russia has put a number of nonproliferation measures into play, among them key export control regulations and constraints on the transfer of WMD and dual use materials both inside and outside the country.

But the perceptions of those dangers as they affect Russia differ greatly. Iran is a major consumer of Russian arms, which helps the military-industrial sector to survive, given many years of limited defense orders for the Russian armed forces. Iran likewise is an extremely important geopolitical partner, a growing “regional superpower” that balances the expansion of Turkey and the increasing U.S. military and political presence in the Black Sea/Caspian region and Middle East, and simultaneously contains the expansion of Sunni radicalism into the North Caucasus and Central Asia.10 Russia also views Iran as the dominant regional power in the neighborhood who can project power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf.11 As for Korea, Russia fears that a major conflict involving the DPRK would destabilize the region more than it does North Korean possession of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in 2008 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear that his government saw North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a threat to the international order, whereas Iran’s potential nuclearization was not.12

Keeping the ayatollahs close

For the U.S., Iran represents a key test case of Russian commitment to nonproliferation. The Obama administration has invested enormous time and effort in obtaining Russian support for sanctions against the Islamic Republic, based upon the conviction that it needs Russian support to curb Iran’s proliferation threat. Thus, spokesmen like Michael McFaul of the National Security Council have pointed out that if Russia wanted an adversarial relationship with the U.S. on Iran there are many things that it could do to worsen our situation.13 Based on such an understanding, President Obama has voiced his optimism that the U.S., with Russian (and Chinese) cooperation, will be able to successfully pass and then implement “tough, strong sanctions” against Iran.14

Even before the Obama administration took office, Russia had made some positive movements in this regard. It withheld delivery of the S-300 from Iran, despite the conclusion of a commercial contract for the advanced Russian air defense system back in 2007.15 It likewise repeatedly deferred completion of the Bu-shehr plutonium reactor until August 2010, citing technical and economic snags.16 These actions have served to rile the Iranians, as have Medvedev’s hints of possible sanctions.

Yet instances of meaningful opposition from Moscow to Iran’s nuclear will to power are few and far between. Despite its warnings to Iran to come clean on its nuclear program, Moscow still formally opposes the imposition of “paralyzing sanctions” against Tehran. Instead, Medvedev speaks publicly of “smart sanctions” and has clarified to Washington that Russia will support only measures that 1) induce Iran to stop enrichment and weaponization, and 2) advance Russian interests.17 Moreover, the smart sanctions that Moscow now advocates would not rise to the level of an arms or energy embargo on Iran.

Indeed, although Moscow grudgingly went along with the latest round of multilateral sanctions passed by the Security Council in June, it has vociferously opposed the supplemental measures applied by the U.S. and EU since then. And in mid-July, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Iranian Oil Minister Masoud Mirkazemi jointly announced a thirty-year road map for bilateral cooperation in oil and gas.18 The deals mapped out as part of that partnership are considerable, and include cooperation on the transportation, swaps, and marketing of natural gas; sales of petroleum products and petrochemicals; and Russia’s establishment of a $100 million liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant to supply remote regions of Iran.19 Most recently, in August 2010, Moscow formally inaugurated the plutonium reactor at Bushehr, making the Islamic Republic a de facto nuclear power–and greatly complicating Western efforts to dissuade the Iranian regime from further nuclear development.

This state of affairs should not have eluded U.S. commentators. For, as John Parker observes in his masterful study of Russo-Iranian relations,

No matter how much Russia and the United States might share security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and expanding influence in the Middle East, a common approach by Washington and Moscow was always undercut by Russia’s rivalry with the United States’ other interests in Iran, and the historical approach to dealing with that country.20

That historical approach, as Parker demonstrates, is one that acknowledges Russia must always have close relations with Iran as a neighbor even though it could ultimately represent a threat. Indeed, already in 1993, Moscow recognized Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs might one day represent a threat to its territory, neighbors, and vital interests.21 But its reaction was greater engagement, not isolation; indeed, the Russian government’s continued sales of weapons to Iran after 1992 was driven in no small part by the recognition that an unbridled Tehran had the potential to disrupt the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even possibly Afghanistan.22 Economic calculations to keep defense industry markets and preserve that sector of its economy were also present, with Russia harboring a long-standing (and probably not unfounded) belief that if it did not sell weapons to Iran, Europe and the U.S. would do so.

Arms sales to Iran, in other words, have always been an arrow in Moscow’s quiver aimed at preventing Iran from pursuing a policy inimical to its interests. And from the Kremlin’s point of view, this approach has succeeded handsomely.23 To openly renege on outstanding contracts, such as the S-300 surface to air missile, not only causes financial losses and Iranian anger and distrust of Russian promises, it also opens the door to Iranian retaliation. Therefore Russia finds it difficult to take Western concerns seriously.

In turn, taking Russia seriously means acknowledging that Russia’s robust economic interests in Iran and the nuclear, energy, and defense industry lobbies that benefit from those interests greatly influence Moscow’s policies. And beyond those lobbies, Russia’s fundamental strategic interests lie in promoting Iranian-U.S. hostility, rather than cooperation. Official Russian statements advocate strengthening Iran’s role as a legitimate actor in a Middle East security system, even as Iranian leaders threaten to destroy Israel and promote state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has even gone so far as to insist that Iran be invited to participate in any security system for the Black Sea region.24

Russia, meanwhile, is reaping the dividends. Since Iran’s nuclear program kicked into high gear over the past half-decade, Moscow has offered nuclear reactors to no fewer than 13 Arab states as part of its efforts to advance its economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East–hardly a contribution to non-proliferation. The lesson is clear. For over a decade, Russian pundits and officials have openly stated that they want Iran to be a partner of Russia, lest the U.S. consolidate its position as the leading foreign power in the Middle East.25 Iranian-American hostility precludes such a consolidation and permits Russia to exercise influence by supporting the maintenance of a system of controlled tension there.

Opportunity within adversity on Korea

While the Kremlin appears to be increasingly upset by Iran, particularly following revelations of a secret Iranian nuclear facility in Qom, Russian officials from President Dmitry Medvedev on down have publicly expressed far more concern about North Korea. Throughout 2009, Russia’s mounting anxiety about trends on the Korean peninsula was palpable, encapsulated in Medvedev’s expression of “great alarm and concern” in response to the DPRK’s April-May nuclear and missile tests,26 and his warnings that Pyongyang was more dangerous than Iran because of its international isolation.27 Moscow even deployed its new S-400 air defense system in the Russian Far East on fears that North Korea might launch more missiles that could go awry, or that the Kim regime might even provoke a major conflict in Northeast Asia.28

Still, this has not translated into a sterner Russian stance toward Pyongyang. To the contrary, Moscow has consistently counseled moderation towards North Korea, been very cautious about sanctions, and steadfastly argued for a resumption of multilateral diplomacy despite North Korea’s provocative nuclear and missile tests. Likewise, Moscow has steadily argued against military action, hinted that sanctions might be lifted if the DPRK rejoined the talks, suggested that the IAEA become involved with this issue, and proclaimed its willingness to provide economic assistance.29 At the root of these overtures is the belief, articulated by Moscow’s envoy to South Korea, Gleb Ivashentsov, that the United States is to blame for the unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula, and that Pyongyang’s behavior is the product of “ultimatums and sanctions” on the part of the international community.30

Yet even here, Moscow sees opportunity within adversity. Kremlin officials have made clear that they view the proliferation crisis in East Asia as generating a need for regional and collective security institutions based on equal security–i.e., those erected at the expense of U.S. leadership. In other words, while North Korea represents a serious crisis threatening Russia’s Asian territory, it also offers Russia a chance for gains at Washington’s expense.

The Korean example is not an anomaly. Rather, it fits perfectly with Alexei Arbatov’s 2008 depiction of Russian thinking about proliferation. To wit:

For Russia the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan and the prospects of further proliferation are adding some new elements to a familiar and old threat, rather than creating a dramatic new one as is the case with the United States. The U.S.SR and Russia have learned to live with this threat and to deal with it on the basis of nuclear deterrence, some limited defenses (like the Moscow BMD system and national Air Defenses) and through diplomacy, which is used to avoid direct confrontation (and still better, to sustain normal relations) with new nuclear nations.31

Based upon this logic, Russia’s response to Indo-Pakistani proliferation has been similarly low-key. Instead, Russia regards vertical proliferation (the qualitative improvement of systems within countries) with greater alarm than it does horizontal proliferation (the diffusion of WMD and ballistic missile technology to a growing number of states). Russia’s posture thus effectively is the photo negative of that of America, which expresses greater alarm at horizontal proliferation than that of the vertical variety.32

Proliferation by design

Clearly, as the foregoing summary suggests, and as Kremlin officials themselves have made abundantly clear, Russia takes a more utilitarian view of proliferation than does the U.S. While it now appears prepared to go part of the way toward a new arms control compact with Washington, Moscow is not likely to support the decisive measures needed to address the threats posed by both Iran and North Korea.

To the contrary, Kremlin maneuvers suggest strongly that Russia is attempting to preserve its partnerships with both Pyongyang and Tehran. There are even signs that Russia is trying to sell reactors to Pakistan, supposedly the greatest proliferation threat that it perceives. Needless to say, this is a very strange posture indeed for a government that supposedly opposes proliferation and supports the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

Dr. Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His latest book, co-edited with Richard Weitz, is The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow, out now from the Strategic Studies Institute Press. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or any other branch of the U.S. government.