Winning the War, Losing the Peace
In the decade since the horrific attacks on America perpetrated by al-Qaeda, our nation has lived with a constant awareness that there are those around the world who want to destroy the United States. In some ways, it is reminiscent of the realities of the Cold War, when Americans lived under the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust.
Or is it? During the Cold War, it was clear that the U.S.SR had adequate warheads to destroy any nation, including the United States. But we assumed that the people who wielded that power were rational—albeit with a radically different view of what the world’s future should be. So we studied the Soviets with great intensity and effort in order to understand their strategy, doctrine, and intentions. We even studied their language, history, and culture in order to better assess and predict their reactions to world events (as well as to enhance the skills of U.S. analysts). Soviet doctrine was taught in military schools, and wargames focused on defeating a Soviet attack across the Fulda Gap in Europe. Sun Tzu’s dictum that one must “know your enemy” was vigorously applied. The American military was determined to face down the “Bear” and to emerge victorious in the event of direct armed conflict with Soviet forces.
Given this history, it would seem reasonable that the enemy that attacked America on 9/11 should receive the same level of effort and attention. But that has not been the case.
The very term War on Terror is misleading and confusing to most Americans. Indeed, it inhibits the nation’s ability to defend itself against a very serious threat. When the threat is defined in terms of a tactic (terrorism), without recognizing the motivation of the enemy, it is unlikely that a comprehensive strategy will be designed to combat the existential threat posed by adherents to authoritarian Islam. It is not surprising, then, that the leadership in America has produced no coherent strategy for dealing with the Islamic ideologues who killed three thousand people and threw the U.S. economy into turmoil a decade ago. Simply stated, if you cannot identify the enemy and understand what compels him to want to destroy you, then you cannot defeat him. And U.S. leaders of both political parties have repeatedly refused to identify Islamic theology as the catalyst for the actions of terrorists and “stealth jihadists” who are passionate about destroying America.
This is tantamount to a fatal error, because—while many Muslims do not adhere to a strict, puritanical interpretation of the Koran—those who do seem to have emerged as the leading voice for the Islamic communities in the nation. The more moderate Muslims in America appear to be relatively unwilling or unable to influence the actions of these radicals. The American leadership, meanwhile, continues to engage and even appease the front groups for the radical Muslim Brotherhood—rather than those Muslims who oppose their views. Groups like the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Council for American Islamic Relations (CAIR) have been the focus of U.S. government outreach programs even though they were identified as unindicted co-conspirators in the 2008 Holy Land Foundation trial. These groups have been quite open about their intention to subvert the U.S. Constitution, yet our leadership refuses to identify them as an existential threat.
Which brings us back to the critical question: how can America be winning when we have yet to articulate with whom we are fighting? It is essential that Americans understand that terrorism is a serious threat, but not one that can ultimately destroy the nation. Merely killing and maiming are not enough to squeeze the life out of the United States; in some ways, it makes America more resilient and determined than ever. Even those employing terrorism as their preferred tactic are beginning to understand that aspect of our national ethos. The U.S. reaction to the events of 9/11 was not what Osama bin Laden anticipated, and the staying power of the American Congress and the U.S. population has demonstrated that the American public has a propensity to fight when threatened. Rather, the greater danger is the “civilization jihad” that is being waged by those determined to bring sharia to America. The encroachment of sharia on the liberties of the U.S. Constitution is a far more serious threat in the long run than violent terrorist acts.
Sharia law is fourteen hundred years old and has seen few substantive changes in that time. It compels adherents to conduct warfare (jihad) against infidels in order to establish a global caliphate in which sharia becomes the law of the land. And it is advancing. The Center for Security Policy, a Washington, D.C. think tank, recently conducted a study on sharia in American courts which found that the phenomenon is far more prevalent than most would think. Specifically, the study found that sharia was considered in twenty-seven court cases in twenty-three states at the appellate court level. Article six of the U.S. Constitution is very specific in directing that it be “…the supreme law of the land.” Nevertheless, sharia is being practiced, de facto, in our court system, representing a form of “stealth jihad” that the leadership in the nation has yet to identify.
We neglect to do so at our own peril. There is ample evidence of the intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood in America. They have stated openly that they are here to force sharia on American society. Yet the U.S. national leadership, the media, and the public in general have not taken their warnings seriously. And because we have not, while it may be possible to say that we are winning the “War on Terror,” we are unequivocally losing the one on sharia.
Lt. Gen. (ret.) William Boykin has been involved in the fight against terrorism and extremism since 1978. He was a founding member of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force, where he served for 13 years, ultimately as commander. After commanding the U.S. Army Special Forces Command and its Special Warfare Center and School, he was appointed to the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He served in that position for four years, retiring in August 2007. He is now a professor of leadership at Hampden Sydney College.
